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JOHN W. GILL et al., Appellants, v. THE CURTIS PUB-
LISHING COMPANY (a Corporation) et al., Respond-
ents. 
[1] Pleading-Motion for Judgment on Pleadings.-On appeal 
from a judgment for defendants on the pleadings, the case 
is reviewed as would be a judgment of dismissal entered fol-
lowing the sustaining of a general demurrer, and the allega-
tions of the complaint must be taken as true, and so taken, 
the question is whether a cause of action has been stated. 
[2] Privacy-Nature of Right.-Right of privacy is recognized 
independently of the common rights of property, contract, 
reputation and physical integrity; it is the right to live one's 
life in seclusion, without being subjected to unwarranted 
and undesired publicity, or simply the right to be let alone. 
[3] !d.-Extent and Limitations on Right.-Difficulty in defiiJ-
ing boundaries of right of privacy, as applied in the publica-
tion field, is inherent in the necessity of balancing the public 
interest in the dissemination of news, information and edu-
cation, against the individual's interest in peace of mind and 
freedom from emotional disturbances; and factors deserving 
t'onsideration may include the medium of publication, the 
extent of the use, the public interest served by the publica-
tion, and the seriousness of interference with the person's 
privacy. 
[4] !d.-Invasion of Right-Publication of Photograph.-Assum-
ing that a magazine article treating of various types of love 
is within the range of public interest in dissemination of 
news, information or education, and in a medium which would 
not be classified .as commercial, the public interest does not 
require the use of any particular person's likeness in con-
nection with such article without his consent, and t<> pub-
lish, as an illustration, an unauthorized photograph of a 
husband and wife in such a manner as to indicate that their 
only interest in each other is sex may impinge seriously on 
their sensibilities and thus constitute an invasion of their 
privacy. 
[5] !d.-Standard by Which Right is to be Measured.-If the test 
by which the right of privacy is to be measured is that which 
[1] See Cal.Jur., Pleading, § 163; Am.Jur., Pleading, § 335. 
[2] Right of privacy, notes, 138 A.L.R. 22; 168 A.L.R. 456; 
14 A.L.R. (2) 750. See, also, Cal.Jur., Privacy; Am.Jur., Pri-
vacy, §§ 2, 5, 9. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Pleading, § 243(1); [2-8] Privacy. 
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would disturb the sensibilities of an ordinary person, then 
it is a question for the trier of fact rather than one of 
law whether the publication of a picture of a husband and 
wife in an amorous pose would outrage or injure the fpel-
ings of an ordinary couple. 
[6] !d.-Waiver or Loss of Right.-Fact that a business oper-
ated by husband and wife is well known throughout the 
world does not create a legitimate and overriding public 
interest so that a photograph taken of them in an amorou:; 
pose at their place of business would constitute a wainn· 
of privacy as regards the unauthorized publieation of such 
photograph, where the magazine article in which such pho-
tograph is used is not aimed at giving newB or information 
about the business. 
[7] Id.-Pleading.-Complaint hy husband and wife that, in dis-
regard of their feelings and rights, an individual dPfendant 
photographed them in an amorous pose at their place of bus-
iness without their knowledge or consent, and that thrJ pho-
tograph was used to illustrate a magazine article treating· oE 
various types of love in such a manner as to depict plain-
tiffs as dissolute and immoral persons and to rob them of 
public esteem, states a cause of action for invasion of pri-
vacy without specifically alleging that they suffered mental 
distress, since it may be inferred from the facts alleged that 
their feelings were hurt and that they suffered mental an-
guish. 
[8] Id.-Pleading.-Allegation in a complaint that publieation oi' 
a photograph of husband and wife in an amorous posP de-
picts them as dissolute persons and holds them up to publie 
scorn and ridicule is not objectionable as stating conclusions 
of law, where such photograph and the magazine article with 
which it was published are attached to the complaint and 
they are susceptible to the construction placed thereon by 
plaintiffs. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County. Arnold Praeger, ,Judge. Reversed. 
Aetion for damages for invasion of pnvaey. ,Judgment 
for defendants on pleadings, reversed. 
Shaelmove & Goldman and Ben F. Goldman, Jr., for Ap-
pellants. 
MaeDonald & Pettit and Thomas H. McGovern for Re-
spondents. 
Loeb & Loeb, as Amiei Curiae on behalf of Respondents. 
,Jan.1952] GILJ_, v. CuRTis PuBLISHING Co. 
[38 C.2d 273; 239 P.2d 630] 
275 
CAH/FB~H, .T.-·-[1] ~\ jmlgment. on the pleading8 for de-
fendants, Curtis Publishing Company and Curtis Circulation 
Company, was granted pursuant to defendants' motion. 'l'he 
ease is reviewed, therefore, the same as would be a judgment 
of dismissal entered following the sustaining of a general 
demurrer, and the allegations in plaintiffs' complaint must 
be taken as true, and so taken the question is whether' a cause 
of action has been stated. (Rannard v. Lockheed Ai1·cra{t 
Corp., 26 Cal.2d 149 [157 P.2d 1]; Seeger v. Odell, 18 Cal.2d 
409 [115 P.2d 977, 136 A.L.R. 1291]; 21 Cal.Jur. 234 et seq.) 
Plaintiffs are husband and wife. Defendants publish, cir-
culate and sell for profit a monthly magazine named Ladie.;' 
Home ,J onrnal. Cartier-Bresson, a photographer, and Dahl, 
a writer, are in the employ of defendants. 
Plaintiffs own and operate a confectionary and ice cream 
eoncession in the Farmers' Market in Los Angeles. They 
have a reputation for industry, integrity, decency and moral-
ity. Cartier-Bresson, in the course of his employment, photo-
g'l'aphecl plaintiffs at their place of business ·without their 
knowledge or consent. The photograph depicts them appar-
ently seated on stools side by side at the patron's side of 
the counter at their concession; plaintiff, Mr. Gill, has his 
ann around his wife and is leaning forward with his cheek 
against hers. The picture was published by defendants in 
their May, 1949, issue of the Ladies' Home Journal, in con-
neetion with an artiele entitled "Love" ·written by Dahl in 
the course of lJis employment. Under the picture appears 
the caption "Publicized as glamorous, desirable, 'love at 
first sight' is a bad risk.'' 'l'he article is a somewhat philo-
sophical and sociological discussion of love between the oppo-
site sexes and its relation to divorce. Love is classified 
generally on the basis of the extent it is founded upon "sex 
attraction" or "affection" and "respect." One of the classi-
fications is called love at first sight, which is founded upon 
100 per cent sex attraction, the kind which the photograph 
i;;; c·aptionecl to portray. That kind of love is called the 
"wrong" one, not lasting and will be followed by divorce. In 
this connection, plaintiffs allege that the picture depicts them 
''in such a manner as to indicate said plaintiffs are loos-e, 
dissolute and immoral persons engaged in the so-called 'wrong 
kind of loye' ... '' 
Defendants knew, or should have known, it is further 
asserted, plaintiffs were happily married and had a high 
moral reputation, but nevertheless, in a malicious disregard 
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of their rig·hts and feelings, published and sold the magazine 
with the article and photograph; that such publication and 
distribution caused plaintiffs to be held up to public "scorn, 
ridicule, hatred, contempt and obloquy and did rob and 
deprive plaintiffs of the benefits of public confidence, respect 
and esteem and injure said plaintiffs in their business and 
social contacts and associations and in their reputations and 
health'' to their damage in the sum of $200,000. 
[2] Hecognition has been given of a right of privacy, in-
dependent of the common rights of property, contract, reputa-
tion and physical integrity, generally described as "the right 
to live one's life in seclusion, without being subjected to un-
warranted and undesired publicity. In short it is the right 
to be let alone." (Melvin v. Reid, 112 Cal.App. 285, 289 [297 
P. 91] .) Remedies have been afforded for the protection of 
that right. (See Melvin v. Reid, sttpra; Cohen v. Marx, 94 
Cal.App.2cl 704 [211 P.2d 320] ; Metter v. Los Angeles 
Examiner, 35 Cal.App.2cl 304 [95 P.2d 491] ; Kerby v. Hal 
Roach Studios, 53 Cal.App.2d 207 [127 P.2d 577] ; Reed v. 
Real Detective Pt~b. Co., 63 Ariz. 294 [162 P.2cl 133] ; Smith 
v. Doss, 251 Ala. 250 [37 So.2d 118] ; Cason v. Baskin, 155 
Pla. 198 [20 So.2d 243]; Corliss v. E. W. Walker Co., 64 
P. 280 [31 L.R.A. 283]; Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. 
Co., 122 Ga.190 [50 S.E. 68]; Bazemore v. Savannah Hospital, 
171 Ga. 257 [155 S.E. 194]; Goodyear Tire & Rttbber Co. v. 
Vandergriff, 52 Ga.App. 662 [184 S.E. 452]; McDaniel v. 
Atlanta Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 60 Ga.App. 92 [2 S.E.2d 
811]; Sikes v. Foster, 74 Ga.App. 350 [39 S.E.2cl 585]; Sidis 
v. F-R Pub. Corp., 113 P.2d 806, dealing with California, 
Georgia, Kansas, Kentucky and Missouri law; Paramount 
Pictures, Inc. v. Leader Press, Inc., 24 P.Supp. 1004; State 
ex rel. Mavity v. Tyndall, 224 Incl. 364 [66 N.E.2d 755] ; 
I[unz v. Allen, 102 Kan. 883 [172 P. 532, L.R.A. 1918D 1151]; 
Jones v. Herald Post Co., 230 Ky. 227 [18 S.W.2d 972]; 
Itzkovich v. Whitaker, 115 La. 479 [39 So. 499, 112 Am.St. 
Rep. 272, 1 L.R.A.N.S. 1147] ; Pallas v. Crowley Milner & Co., 
322 Mich. 411 [33 N.W.2d 911] ; Munden v. Harris, 153 Mo. 
App. 652 [134 S.W. 1076] ; Barber v. Time, Inc., 348 Mo. 
1199 [159 S.W.2d 291]; F'lake v. Greensboro News Co., 212 
N.C. 780 [195 S.E. 55] ; Norman v. City of Las Vegas, 64 
Nev. 38 [177 P.2d 442]; McGovern v. Van Riper, 137 N.J.Eq. 
24 [43 A.2d 514]; Bednarik v. Bednarik, 18 N.J.Misc. 633 
[16 A.2cl 80] ; Hinish v. Meier & Frank Co., 166 Ore. 482 
[113 P.2d 438] ; Holloman v. Life Ins. Co. of Virgin,ia, 192 
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S.C. 454 [7 S.E.2d 169, 127 A.L.R. 110]; Rest., Torts, § 867; 
37 Va.L.Rev., 335; 22 So.Cal.L.Rev. 320; 48 Columb.L.Rev., 
713; 4 Harv.L.Rev., 193; 41 Am.Jur., Privacy, § 5; 138 
A.L.R. 22; 168 A.L.R. 446; 14 A.L.R.2d 750.) There are 
more states which have recognized such a right than have not, 
and the former represent the modern trend. (See cases 
collected 138 A.L.R. 22; 168 A.L.R. 446; 14 A.L.R.2d 750; 
40 Columb.L.Rev. 713.) The arguments advanced by the 
authorities pro and con are summarized: ''One of the prin-
cipal arguments advanced in support of the doctrine of pri-
vacy by its original exponents is that the increased complexity 
and intensity of modern civilization and the development of 
man's spiritual sensibilities have rendered man more sensitive 
to publicity and have increased his need of privacy, while 
the great technological improvements in the means of com-
munication have more and more subjected the intimacies of 
his private life to exploitation by those who pander to com-
mercialism and to prurient and idle curiosity. A legally 
enforceable right of privacy is deemed to be a proper protec-
tion against this type of encroachment upon the personality 
of the individual. While the early law gave redress only for 
physical interference with life and property, it is now recog-
nized that man's spiritual nature also needs protection, and 
that his feelings as well as his limbs should be inviolate. In 
the formative period of the common law, before the day of 
newspapers, radio, and photography, when life was simpler 
and human relations more direct, the individual could himself 
adequately protect his privacy. Today this would be im-
possible, and to cast the individual upon his own resources 
in this regard would only result in a relapse into a system 
of private vengeance and violence which our civilization has 
outgrown. Freedom of speech and freedom of the press have 
been urged as a ground for denying the existence of the 
right of privacy. The right of privacy does undoubtedly 
infringe upon absolute freedom of speech and of the press, 
and it also clashes with the interest of the public in having 
a free dissemination of news and information. These para~ 
mount public interests must be taken into account in placing 
the necessary limitations upon the right of privacy. But if 
this right of the individual is not without qualifications, 
neither is freedom of speech and of the press unlimited. The 
latter privilege is subject to the qualification that it shall not 
be so exercised as to abuse the rights of individuals. Ac-
cordingly, it is held by courts recognizing the right of privacy 
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that the constitutional guaranties of freedom of speech and 
of the press do not warrant the publication of matter con-
stituting an invasion of the right of privacy any more than 
they give the right to defame a person. 'l'he absence of prece-
dent affirming the existence of the right of privacy has been 
stressed by the courts denying or doubting the existence of 
such a right. This was one of the principal grounds of the 
first decision repudiating the doctrine of privacy. But the 
courts adopting the other view take the position that the lack 
of specific precedent is not decisive. It has been objected 
that a recognition of the right of privacy would open up a 
vast field of litigation, some of it bordering on the absurd. 
But courts recog·nizing the right deny the validity of this 
objection. According to the latter view, the fact that a recog-
nition of the right would involve many cases near the border 
line, and would present perplexing questions, is not a good 
ground for denying the existence of such right or refusing· 
to give relief in a case where it is clearly shown that a legal 
wrong has been done. -While it is clear that when dealing with 
injuries to feelings alone it is difficult to fix definite and 
practical limits separating that which is merely a trivial 
annoyance to a particular individual from that of which the 
law will take cognizance, the difficulty is not insurmountable. 
The supposed principle of law that remedies are not afforded 
for mental pain or distress or injuries to the sensibilities, 
where there is no other injury involved, has been asserted as 
an argument against the right of privacy." ( 41 Am.Jur., 
Privacy, § 9.) 
vVe believe the reasons in favor of the right are persuasive, 
especially in the light of the declaration by this court that 
''concepts of the sanctity of personal rights are specifically 
protected by the Constitutions, both state and federal, and 
the courts have properly given them a place of high dignity, 
and worthy of especial protection." (Orloff v. Los Angeles 
Tm·f Club, 30 Cal.2cl110, 117 [180 P.2d 321, 171 A.L.R. 913].) 
[3] The difficulty in defining the boundaries of the right, 
as applied in the publication field, is inherent in the necessity 
of balancing the public interest in the dissemination of news, 
information and education against the individuals' interest 
in peace of mind and freedom from emotional disturbances. 
vVhen words relating to or actual pictures of a person or his 
name are published, the circumstances may indicate that 
public interest -is predominant. Factors deserving considera-
tion may include the medium of publication, the extent of 
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the use, the pnblie interest served by the publication, and 
the seriousness of the interference with the person's privacy. 
In the instant case, it is not necessary to decide whether the 
article accompanying the photograph is news or information 
such as the public interest demands. It might be described 
as a nonfictional pseudopsychological or sociological discus-
sion. [4] Assuming it to be within the range of public interest 
in dissemination of news, information or education, and in 
a medium that would not be classed as commercial-for profit 
or advertising-there appears no necessity for the use in con-
nection with the article without their consent, of a photograph 
of plaintiffs. The article, to fulfill its purpose and satisfy the 
public interest, if any, in the subject matter discussed, could, 
possibly, stand alone without any picture. In any event, the 
public interest did not require the use of any particular 
person's likeness nor that of plaintiffs without their consent. 
'rhe likeness is only illustrative of a part of the article, like 
a schematic diagram in a scientific dissertation, except that 
there is far less necessary pertinency. On the other hand, 
the impact on plaintiffs has been as alleged, and it is apparent 
from the article and caption under the picture, that they are 
depicted as persons whose only interest in each other is sex, 
a characterization that may be said to impinge seriously upon 
their sensibilities. 
In Melvin v. Reid, stlpra, 112 Cal.App. 285, defendant ex-
hibited a motion picture depicting degrading :incidents in 
plaintiff's past life, using her maiden name, when she had 
reformed for eight years. It was held that such incidents as 
occurred during her trial for murder, being part of a public 
record, were clothed with a public interest, but that it was 
"unnecessary" to use her name in connection with other in-
cidents in her life. On the other hand, in Metter v. Los Angeles 
E.xarniner, stlpra, 35 Cal.App.2d 304, the court felt the public 
interest in the news of a suicide by a woman from a down-
town business building resulting in a news story and photo-
graph of her overshadowed the invasion, if any, of her 
husband's right of privacy. The court found liability in Kerby 
v. Hal Roach Sttlclios, sttpm, 53 Cal.App.2d 207, where an 
actress' name was signed to advertising material, consisting 
of a questionable letter, concerning a motion picture in which 
she did not have a part, pointing out that the publicity arising 
from her position as an actress did not justify the invasion. 
Cohen v. Marx, s~tpra, 94 Cal.App.2d 704, turned upon the 
legitimate public interest in a public prize fighter. 
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Defendants urge, however, that there is not a suillciently 
serious invasion of plaintiffs' privacy. In that connection, 
they refer to the Restatement where the right is stated: ''A 
person who unreasonably and seriously interferes with an-
other's interest in not having his affairs known to others or 
his likeness exhibited to the public is liable to the other." 
(Rest., Torts, § 867.) "The rule stated in this Section gives 
protection to the interest which a person has in living with 
some privacy, but this protection is relative to the customs 
of the time and place and to the habits and occupation of 
the plaintiff. One who is not a recluse must expect the ordi-
nary incidents of community life of which he is a part. These 
include comment upon his conduct, the more or less casual 
observation of his neighbors as to what he does upon his own 
land and the possibility that he may be photographed as a 
part of a street scene or a group of persons. . . . On the other 
hand, liability exists only if the defendant's conduct was 
such that he should have realized that it would be offensive 
to persons of ordinary sensibilities. It is only where the in-
trusion has gone beyond the limits of decency that liability 
accrues. These limits are exceeded where intimate details of 
the life of one who has never manifested a desire to have 
publicity are exposed to the public, or where photographs of 
a person in an embarrasing pose are surreptitiously taken and 
published. . . . In determining liability, the knowledge and 
motives of the defendant, the sex, station in life, previous 
habits of the plaintiff with reference to publicity, and other 
similar matters are considered. A distinction can be made in 
favor of news items and against advertising use.'' (Rest., 
Torts, § 867, comments C & D.) We have seen that the cap-
tion under the picture describes it as "love at first sight" 
and the article says such love is based on 100 per cent sex. 
It is not unreasonable to believe such would be seriously 
humiliat~ng and disturbing to plaintiffs' sensibilities, and it is 
so alleged, especially when we consider it deals with the in-
timate and private relationship between the opposite sexes 
and marriage. [5] If the test is, as defendants claim, what 
an ordinary man would consider such, then it is a question 
for the trier of fact rather than one of law. 
[6] Defendants rely upon cases where through their own 
acts or by an incident thrust upon them, a person's affairs 
became of public interest and he cannot recover for the 
publicity given; that they have waived their right of privacy. 
\Ve have seen, however, that there was no legitimate interest 
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in using plaintiffs' likenesses in this article, and it may be 
added that there was no pressing need for speed which is 
customarily a factor in disseminating news. It should be ob-
served, that referring to the use of a person's likeness for 
a legitimate public interest as not actionable because it indi-
cates a waiver by the person of his right, is of doubtful 
validity, for it has been applied whether the publication 
having news value arose out of an incident of his own making 
or involuntarily and without his fault thrust upon him. We 
cannot agree that from the allegation in the complaint that 
plaintiffs' business is well known to persons throughout the 
world, puts the case within the category of legitimate and 
overriding public interest, for the article, and use of the 
photograph with it, was not aimed at giving news or informa-
tion about plaintiffs' business. 
The article may be interpreted as not dealing with actual 
recent or past events in the lives of actual persons. It is more 
a philosophical or psychological or semi-educational discus-
sion of abstractions. Hence, such cases as S1'dis v. F-R Pub. 
Corp., supra, 113 F.2d 806, dealing with the later career of a 
once infant prodigy, under a "Where Are They Now" heading, 
are not in point. Cases from New York are of little assistance, 
for there the court of appeals rejected the existence of a right 
of privacy and a statute which was passed creating the right 
limited it to the use of a person's name, picture or portrait 
"for advertising purposes, or purposes of trade." (See Sarat 
Lahiri v. Daily Mirror, 162 Misc. 776 [295 N.Y.S. 382].) 
[7] Plaintiffs do not allege that their right of privacy was 
invaded or that they suffered mental distress, assert defend-
ants, and thus no cause of action is stated. Plainly the 
complaint alleges facts which clearly show a violation of 
plaintiffs' right of privacy. More is not necessary. It is 
alleged that in disregard of plaintiffs' feelings and rights the 
publication was made ; that the article depicted plaintiffs as 
dissolute and immoral persons and robbed them of public 
esteem; that by reason of the acts alleged, plaintiffs were 
damaged in the sum of $200,000. We think that it may be at 
least inferred therefrom that their feelings were hurt and 
they suffered mental anguish. The proceeding is, as heretofore 
stated, to be treated as though a general demurrer had been 
sustained. So treated, the complaint states a cause of action. 
(Hudson v. Craft, 33 Cal.2d 654 [204 P.2d 1, 7 A.L.R.2d696] .) 
[8] It is said the allegation that the publication depicts 
plaintiffs as dissolute persons and holds them up to public 
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scorn and ridicule are conclusions of law. vVe do not thin1 ~ 
so, The published article and likeness are attached to the 
complaint, and as seen from the foregoing discussion, they ~,re 
susceptible of the construction placed thereon by plaintifs. 
Judgment reversed. 
Edmonds, J., Traynor, J., Schauer, J., and Spence, J., 
concurred. 
[Sac. No. 6082. In Bank. Jan. 18, 1952.] 
CHARLES lVL COOKE et al., Respondents, v. ANTONIO 
RAMPONI et al., Appellants. 
[1] Licenses-In Real Property-Irrevocable Licenses.-Where a 
licensee has entered on the land of another under a parol 
license and has expended money or its equivalent in labor 
in execution of the license, the license becomes irrevocable, 
the licensee will have a right of entry on the land for the 
purpose of maintaining his structures or his rights under the 
license, and the license will continue for so long a time as the 
nature of it calls for. 
[2] Id.-In Real Property-Irrevocable Licenses.-Principal basis 
for view as to irrevocability of a license where licensee has 
entered on land of licensor for certain purposes is the doctrine 
of equitable estoppel; the license, similar in its essentials to 
an easement, is declared to be irrevocable to prevent the 
licensor from perpetrating a fraud on the licensee. 
[3] Estoppel-Against State.-Doctrine of estoppel may, in excep-
tional circumstances, be applied in favor of a private person 
against the state or its agencies. 
[4] !d.-Against State.-Judgment decreeing plaintiffs' ownership 
of an easement over defendants' land need not rest on theory 
of estoppel against the state where the record establishes an 
executed, irrevocable parol license in favor of plaintiffs as the 
result of their respective agreements with the state'~ suc-
cessors in interest, including defendants, and the mutual 
performance of the parties thereunder. 
[1] See Cal.Jur., Licenses, § 67; Am.Jur., Licenses, § 103. 
[3] Application of doctrine of estoppel against government and 
its governmental agencies, note, 1 A.L.R.2d 338. See, also, Cal.Jur., 
Estoppel, § 28; Am.Jur., Estoppel, § 166. 
McK. Dig. References: [1,2,5] Licenses, §70; [3,4] :mstoppel, 
§ 44. 
